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Loom Health Data Services: security

Status: A1-A11 are the design; A12 records the W1-4 server code. Merged is not deployed. This page currently holds only the authorization section (PRP item W1-4). The Authorization Server code lives in apps/loom-health-cp/src/auth/ and is not wired into compose.ts / main.ts, not deployed, and not run against Entra, Key Vault or Graph (A12 lists what was and was not measured). The rest of this page (network, keys, audit, evidence pack) belongs to W1-9 and later waves. Mapping only, no ATO, FedRAMP or HIPAA-compliance claim (PRPs/active/loom-health-data-services/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:3-10).

Paths below are repo-relative. PRP/ is shorthand for PRPs/active/loom-health-data-services/. Every repo claim cites file:line at origin/main be5f24fc2. Sources read in full: PRP/W01-control-plane-identity-stamp.md, PRP/ARCHITECTURE.md, PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md, PRP/LOOM-INTEGRATION.md, PRP/OPERATOR-DECISIONS-2026-10-22.md, ADR-005, 006, 009, 010, 011 and 012, and apps/loom-health-cp/{README.md,package.json,src/config.ts,src/middleware/auth.ts,src/http/app.ts,src/registry/types.ts}. Read only in part, so claims from them are limited to the cited lines: PRP/TEST-STRATEGY.md (lines 25-159), PRP/AHDS-MODEL-MAP.md (20-64), PRP/RISKS-AND-OPEN-DECISIONS.md (lines 21-24 only), PRP/AZURE-GOV-AVAILABILITY.md (line 45 only), apps/fiab-console/lib/azure/cloud-endpoints.ts (480-510). Anything about third-party code (node-oidc-provider, Medplum) is UNVERIFIED: none of it was read for this pass.

External normative sources, all read for this pass: SMART App Launch STU 2.2 (scopes and launch context, conformance, backend services, asymmetric client auth).

A. Authorization: SMART App Launch v2 over Entra ID (W1-4)

A1. What exists today and what this section decides

  • Already there: the control plane's own admin API verifies Entra tokens: RS256, issuer pinned to one Entra tenant, audience list, exp required (apps/loom-health-cp/src/middleware/auth.ts:45-60). It also checks the app roles HealthCP.Reader/Admin/StampReporter (auth.ts:13-23,70). That guards the control plane. It is not the SMART authorization server, and those roles never become FHIR scopes.
  • Decided by ADR-010: Entra is the only identity provider. The LHDS Authorization Server (AS) federates to Entra over OIDC, maps Entra group/app-role membership to SMART scopes, handles launch context, mints short-lived SMART tokens whose audience is the tenant FHIR base, and serves smart-configuration and Backend Services with JWKS. Engines validate the LHDS token through the PDP and never talk to Entra (PRP/adr/ADR-010-identity-smart.md:15-28).
  • Decided here: the scope grammar subset LHDS accepts (A2), launch contexts (A3), the role-to-scope table and its intersection rule (A4), the per-cloud Entra mapping (A5), the Backend Services JWKS flow (A6), the access-token claims contract the PDP consumes (A7), the tenant-match rule (A8), the negative-scope test matrix (A9), and the ADR-010 implementation choice with its pass bar and fallback (A10).

Endpoints. This design adds no route that the PRP and the SMART spec do not already require. SMART requires a token_endpoint and, for launch flows, an authorization_endpoint. It also requires the discovery document at {fhirBase}/.well-known/smart-configuration, which ADR-010:22 names. Their concrete paths are an implementation detail recorded in that discovery document. No introspection, revocation, management or dynamic-registration endpoint is designed or advertised. Client registration has no surface in the PRP yet; see open question Q4.

A2. Scope grammar LHDS accepts

<compartment>/<type>.<perms>[?<constraint>]

Part Accepted Rejected (scope dropped from the grant, never widened)
compartment patient, user (authorization-code grant); system (client-credentials grant only) system/ in authorization-code; patient/ or user/ in client-credentials
type a FHIR R4 resource type, or * unknown type names
perms (v2) a non-empty, in-order subset of cruds out-of-order (.sr), repeated (.rr) or unknown (.x) letters. The spec says these "MAY be ignored"; LHDS chooses to ignore them
perms (v1) .read -> .rs, .write -> .cud, .* -> .cruds (spec v1 mapping) when the tenant's v1 flag is on (PRP/AHDS-MODEL-MAP.md:32 "v1 compatibility flag") v1 forms when the flag is off
constraint exactly one category=<system>\|<code> or category=<code> on Observation, Condition, DocumentReference any other parameter, more than one parameter, or category on any other type. Granting such a scope without its constraint would be an over-grant
context / identity openid, fhirUser, launch, launch/patient, offline_access launch/encounter, online_access and profile are not advertised in v1 (Q3)

Two normalisations are fixed so the Rego bundle parses one grammar:

  1. The JWT scope claim (A7) carries v2 form only: v1 requests are rewritten, and duplicate scopes are collapsed.
  2. The token response scope echoes the granted scopes in the client's own syntax, because SMART clients compare the response with their request.

The discovery document advertises permission-v2, permission-patient, permission-user and permission-offline. It adds permission-v1 only when the tenant flag is on. code_challenge_methods_supported is exactly ["S256"]: the spec requires S256 to be listed and plain never to be.

A3. Launch contexts

Flow Request AS behaviour Token response / claims
Standalone, patient picked launch/patient + patient/... scopes After Entra sign-in, the AS shows a patient picker for the tenant. The picker searches with the user's own user/Patient.rs ceiling. A user without that ceiling cannot pick, so every patient/ scope is dropped patient = chosen id; need_patient_banner: true; tenant = tenant slug
EHR launch launch scope + launch=<handle> The handle is minted by the Loom item editor (ADR-010:20). It is single-use, valid for 5 minutes or less, and bound to (tenant, Entra oid, client_id, patient, optional encounter / fhirContext). A different user, a different client, a second use or expiry is refused patient, encounter when bound, fhirContext when bound, need_patient_banner: false, tenant
Identity openid fhirUser id_token signed by the AS. fhirUser is the absolute URL of the Practitioner, Patient or RelatedPerson whose identifier matches the Entra user (Q5). If no match exists, fhirUser is not granted. Inventing a URL is forbidden id_token
Refresh offline_access A refresh token is issued only when at least one data scope is granted. Every refresh re-runs the full mapping (A4), so a removed group membership shrinks the scopes at the next refresh. A refresh never adds scopes beyond the original grant new access_token, scope

patient/ scopes without an established patient context are dropped at issuance. A token that still somehow carries a patient/ scope with no patient claim is denied for every patient/ access by the PDP (A7, N21).

A4. Role-to-scope mapping (ceiling, not grant)

The canonical machine-readable table is apps/loom-health-cp/src/auth/role-scope-map.v1.json (version lhds-scope-map/1). It exists so that the W1-5 scope-matrix test can be generated from it, and so that "a new scope without a row fails the build" (PRP/TEST-STRATEGY.md:145-147). Lift values from the JSON; do not transcribe them from this page. The role names mirror AHDS (PRP/AHDS-MODEL-MAP.md:33,59, PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:54). The AHDS semantics behind each role were not re-read from Microsoft Learn for this pass (UNVERIFIED), notably whether AHDS Writer includes delete. The ceilings below are an LHDS decision, not a transcription.

Role id Authorization-code ceiling Client-credentials ceiling Role-gated operations (wave)
fhir-data-reader user/*.rs patient/*.rs system/*.rs none
fhir-data-writer user/*.cruds patient/*.cruds system/*.cruds none
fhir-data-contributor user/*.cruds patient/*.cruds system/*.cruds $purge-history (W7)
fhir-smart-user user/*.rs patient/*.rs none none
fhir-data-exporter none system/*.rs $export (W6)
fhir-data-importer none system/*.cu $import (W6)
fhir-data-converter none none $convert-data (W5)
fhir-bulk-operator none none $bulk-delete $bulk-update (W7)
fhir-search-parameter-manager user/SearchParameter.cruds system/SearchParameter.cruds $reindex (W7)
dicom-data-reader none none dicom:read (W3)
dicom-data-owner none none dicom:read dicom:write dicom:delete (W3)
mpi none none mpi:$match mpi:$everything (W11; ADR-006:32 also requires user/Patient.rs)
health-tenant-admin none none none. Control plane only, never data (D12, PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:216)
break-glass none none none in W1. The W8 elevation flow defines it (PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:55)

Intersection rule (normative). For each requested scope s, and each ceiling c from the union of the caller's role ceilings for the grant type:

  1. c matches only when it has the same compartment as s.
  2. The type matches when c.type == '*' or c.type == s.type.
  3. The resulting permissions are s.perms ∩ c.perms.
  4. When c is unconstrained, the result carries s's constraint. When c is constrained, the result requires an identical constraint on s.

The grant is the union of the non-empty results, intersected the same way with the client registration's allowed scopes. Worked examples: patient/*.cruds against the ceiling patient/*.rs grants patient/*.rs (narrowed). user/Observation.c against user/*.rs grants nothing (dropped). An empty data-scope grant with openid alone still returns a token. An empty grant overall returns OAuth invalid_scope.

Operations are not scopes. They travel in the lhds_roles claim (A7), and the PDP checks them per request in addition to the scope.

A5. Entra mapping per cloud

How membership reaches the AS. Each LHDS tenant holds a list of bindings (Entra group objectId -> role id). This is the Access (roles -> scopes) tab on the health-tenant item (PRP/LOOM-INTEGRATION.md:10). On every authorization and every refresh, the AS resolves the user's membership of exactly the bound group ids server-side through Microsoft Graph. It never trusts a groups claim carried by the client. That is the threat model's control for group-claim injection (PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:208), and it also avoids the token group-overage case. Entra app roles are not used for data roles because they are not tenant-scoped. A VISN clinician must reach only that VISN's tenant.

Storage gap. TenantDoc has no bindings field (apps/loom-health-cp/src/registry/types.ts:90-100), and TenantPatchSchema is a strictObject that rejects unknown keys (types.ts:64-73). Bindings therefore need either a new registry field (that is W1-3 code) or a new Cosmos container owned by src/auth/. A new container needs a control-plane.bicep row, because the README states that containers must exist before start (apps/loom-health-cp/README.md:53-58). Q6 asks which.

What differs per cloud:

Item Commercial / GCC GCC-High / IL5 DoD Source
Entra authority login.microsoftonline.com login.microsoftonline.us login.microsoftonline.us apps/loom-health-cp/src/config.ts:11-17
Graph host graph.microsoft.com graph.microsoft.us dod-graph.microsoft.us apps/fiab-console/lib/azure/cloud-endpoints.ts:493
Patient-facing identity Entra External ID B2B, Gov-to-Gov tenants only same as GCC-High D13 (PRP/RISKS-AND-OPEN-DECISIONS.md:22); PRP/AZURE-GOV-AVAILABILITY.md:45
App registration one per Entra tenant per cloud same same ADR-010:15-16
Exercised? Commercial: never (no AS yet). GCC: supported-in-code only, never exercised (cloud-parity.md) never; IL5 has no recorded run (PRP/ARCHITECTURE.md:177) boundary enum lacks DoD (PRP/ARCHITECTURE.md:177), so not deployable today

The role-to-scope table (A4) is identical in every cloud. Only the hosts, the app registration and the patient-identity path vary (cloud-parity.md).

Two discrepancies to carry into implementation:

  • ADR-010:29-30 says Gov endpoints are resolved "through the existing cloud-endpoints.ts". loom-health-cp, however, is a separate package with its own AUTHORITY_BY_CLOUD (config.ts:11-17) and no Graph host resolver. The implementation must add a GRAPH_BY_CLOUD that mirrors cloud-endpoints.ts:493, including the 3-way DoD split, plus a unit test per cloud.
  • The Graph membership read needs an application permission on the AS identity that only a tenant admin can consent to. That is a genuine tenant-level consent and must be a registered gate with Fix-it (auto-bind-by-default.md "Allowed"). The exact least-privilege Graph permission and call (checkMemberGroups vs transitiveMemberOf) is UNVERIFIED (Q7).

Tenant-of-identity rule. The tid of the authenticating Entra user must equal the Entra tenant bound to the LHDS tenant. v1 binds every LHDS tenant to the control plane's single Entra tenant (config.ts:57,67-68). Multi-Entra customers are Q8.

A6. Backend Services (client credentials with a JWKS)

Registration record, owned by src/auth/: client_id, LHDS tenant, either jwksUrl (TLS, unauthenticated; strongly preferred by the spec) or a JWKS held by value (the spec requires servers to support both), allowed system/ scopes, role ids, and status.

Verification order on POST token_endpoint with grant_type=client_credentials, client_assertion_type=urn:ietf:params:oauth:client-assertion-type:jwt-bearer, client_assertion, scope. Every failure returns invalid_client, except an empty scope grant, which returns invalid_scope.

  1. JOSE header: typ is JWT. alg is in {RS384, ES384}; anything else, including none, HS* and RS256, is refused. kid is present.
  2. Claims: iss == sub == client_id of a registered, active client. aud == the exact token_endpoint URL. exp is in the future and no more than 300 s ahead of AS time; LHDS allows 60 s of clock skew on the past side only. jti is present.
  3. If jku is present it must equal the registered jwksUrl exactly, otherwise refuse. If it is absent, use the registered URL or the by-value set.
  4. Select keys by kid and a kty consistent with alg. Exactly one key must match; zero or two is refused.
  5. Verify the signature.
  6. Replay: (iss, jti) is stored with a TTL of exp + skew. A second presentation is refused. The store must be shared across AS replicas: a Cosmos container with TTL, created-if-absent so that a 409 means replay. That is a new container (Q6).
  7. JWKS caching: never longer than the client's Cache-Control allows (spec "SHALL NOT").
  8. Response: token_type: bearer, expires_in: 300, scope = the granted system/ scopes. No refresh token (spec "SHOULD NOT").

Egress consequence. Fetching a client's jwksUrl is outbound traffic. The stamp egress is an FQDN allow-list maintained in bicep (PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:101-103). The control plane runs as a Container App rather than on a stamp (PRP/ARCHITECTURE.md:88-89), so the control plane's own egress posture governs these fetches. Whether a JWKS host must be allow-listed per client is Q9.

A7. Access-token claims contract (the PDP input; W1-5 builds Rego against this)

Format: a JWT signed by the AS, with header typ: at+jwt (RFC 9068), alg: ES384 and kid. The PDP validates against the AS JWKS. Contract version: lhds_ver = "lhds-at/1". The PDP denies every request whose token fails any row below. No row has a default; a missing claim means deny.

Claim Type Value PDP rule
iss string the AS issuer URL for this cloud's control plane exact match with the bundle's configured issuer. An Entra issuer is denied (engines never accept Entra tokens, ADR-010:27-28)
aud string (single) the exact base URL the client named in the authorize aud parameter: the tenant FHIR base (https://<tenant>.health.<loom-domain>/fhir, PRP/AHDS-MODEL-MAP.md:39) or its path-prefix form (ADR-006:6) equals the base URL of the request (A8)
exp, iat number exp - iat ≤ 300 s for system; user tokens default 300 s (Q10) now < exp; iat ≤ now + 60
jti string unique carried into the audit record
lhds_ver string lhds-at/1 any other value is denied
tenant string LHDS tenant slug, matching ^[a-z0-9](?:[a-z0-9-]{0,38}[a-z0-9])$ (registry/types.ts:7). Also returned as the SMART tenant launch parameter A8
sub string Entra oid (user) or client_id (system) audit only
sub_type "user" | "system" from the grant type system/ scopes are honoured only when system; user/ and patient/ only when user
idp_tid string (GUID) Entra tenant of the authenticated identity; absent for system audit only (enforced at issuance, A5)
client_id string the SMART client audit; obligations
scope string, space-delimited granted scopes in v2 form only (A2); context scopes included parsed with the A2 grammar. An unparseable scope is ignored, never widened
patient string FHIR logical id required for any patient/ scope. Without it, every patient/ access is denied
encounter string optional informational in W1
fhirUser string (URL) present only when granted (A3) informational in W1
lhds_roles string[] role ids from A4 that contributed to the grant operation gates (A4 last column)
lhds_map_ver string lhds-scope-map/1 audit (the evidence pack's role/scope inventory, PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:309-310)
pou string[] purpose of use, v3-ActReason codes. W1 issues TREAT for users and the registered value for clients; BTG is never issued in W1 input to the W8 consent rules; W1 only logs it (Q11)

Reserved, not issued in W1: act (RFC 8693 delegation for the Loom BFF, PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:56, PRP/LOOM-INTEGRATION.md:39) and cnf (DPoP, D15 in the threat model). The PDP must deny a token that carries either claim until a later contract version defines it. That prevents a half-implemented delegation from being honoured.

Request-side inputs the PDP needs. The interceptor contract is owned by W1-5 and listed here only so the claims above are sufficient: tenant (from the URL), base (the base URL as received), interaction (read|vread|search|create|update|patch|delete|history|operation), type, id, op, search params, and for patient-compartment checks the resource's patient-compartment owners as resolved by the engine (ADR-011:12-15).

Scope evaluation in Rego. A request is permitted only when some granted scope matches all four of:

  1. The compartment fits sub_type.
  2. The type matches, or the scope type is *.
  3. The interaction's letter is in the perms: create is c; read, vread and history-instance are r; update and patch are u; delete is d; search is s.
  4. For patient/, the target is in the patient compartment. A search must be bound to that patient; an unbound search is denied, not silently filtered.

A constrained scope permits a search only when the search carries the same category, and a read only when the resource has it. The tenant rule (A8) must also hold.

A8. Tenant-match rule

All of the following must hold. Any failure is 403, audited with both values. Comparisons are exact, with no case-folding, trimming or Unicode normalisation.

  • T1 The tenant claim equals the tenant resolved from the request (URL prefix /{tenant}/... or host <tenant>.health...). A mismatch is 403 (ADR-006:6-8).
  • T2 aud equals the base URL of the request, and that base belongs to the same tenant in the bundle's tenant map.
  • T3 The tenant is homed on this stamp. The bundle carries the stamp's tenant list from the routing map (apps/loom-health-cp/src/routing/ is the publisher, README.md:10). A token for a tenant on another stamp is denied even when T1 and T2 hold, which protects against a mis-route.
  • T4 At issuance (AS side): the Entra tid equals the tenant's bound Entra tenant (A5), and the tenant status is active. TENANT_STATUSES is in registry/types.ts:13. A suspended or destroying tenant gets no token.

A9. Negative-scope test matrix

Every deny row is paired with a permit control: the same token and the same fixture with one variable changed. That pairing is required by assertion-design.md "done" #4. The Breaks if column names the defect that turns the row red. Rows N1-N17 and N21-N22 run against the PDP (W1-5 opa test, generated from role-scope-map.v1.json). The other rows run against the AS (W1-4 tests).

# Input Expected Paired permit control Breaks if
N1 patient/Observation.rs, read Condition/c1 in the patient's compartment deny read Observation/o1, same patient: permit type match ignores the type (TEST-STRATEGY.md:37-40)
N2 patient/Observation.rs, read Observation/o2 of another patient deny o1 of the token's patient: permit the compartment check is skipped
N3 patient/Observation.rs, search Observation with no patient param deny search Observation?patient=<p>: permit an unbound search is allowed or filtered silently
N4 user/Observation.rs, create Observation deny search Observation: permit perms letters are not checked
N5 user/Observation.r, search Observation deny read Observation/o1: permit r and s are conflated
N6 requested user/Observation.sr not granted (absent from scope) requested user/Observation.rs: granted the parser sorts or accepts out-of-order letters
N7 patient/Observation.rs?category=laboratory, read a vital-signs Observation deny a laboratory Observation: permit the constraint is dropped by the PDP
N8 requested patient/Observation.rs?code=1234-5 not granted ?category=laboratory: granted the AS strips an unsupported constraint and widens the scope
N9 fhir-smart-user requests user/Patient.cruds granted user/Patient.rs exactly reader requests user/Patient.rs: granted the intersection returns the request unmodified (mutation arm for the W1-4 receipt)
N10 health-tenant-admin only; read Patient/p the token carries no data scope; PDP deny the same user plus fhir-data-reader: permit the admin role inherits data access (D12)
N11 authorization-code flow requests system/*.rs not granted client-credentials with the exporter role: granted the compartment is not tied to the grant type
N12 client-credentials requests patient/*.rs invalid_scope system/*.rs: granted same as N11, reverse direction
N13 token tenant=visn-01, URL /visn-02/fhir/Patient/p 403 URL /visn-01/...: permit the PDP takes the tenant from the token alone (T1)
N14 token aud = the visn-01 FHIR base, request to the visn-01 DICOMweb base deny request to the FHIR base: permit aud is not compared (T2)
N15 token tenant=visn-01, request tenant Visn-01 deny visn-01: permit the comparison case-folds (A8)
N16 a valid Entra token for the AS audience deny an AS-issued token: permit iss is not pinned (ADR-010:27)
N17 lhds_ver="lhds-at/2"; or act present; or exp=now-1 deny (three cases) lhds-at/1, no act, valid exp: permit an unknown version, a reserved claim or expiry is tolerated
N18 backend assertion with (a) jku ≠ registered URL, (b) a replayed jti, © exp=now+301, (d) alg=RS256, (e) aud ≠ token URL, (f) two keys sharing the kid invalid_client (six cases) a well-formed assertion: token issued each verification step of A6 is skipped
N19 EHR launch handle reused, or presented by another oid, or by another client_id refused (three cases) first use by the bound user and client: token with patient the handle binding is not checked (A3)
N20 refresh after the user is removed from the bound group refresh refused, or scope loses the role's scopes refresh with membership intact: same scopes refresh replays the stored grant without re-running A4
N21 a token carrying a patient/ scope but no patient claim deny every patient/ access with patient: permit a missing claim defaults to permit
N22 patient/*.rs, create Condition deny read Condition in the compartment: permit the wildcard type also wildcards the perms
N23 authorize with code_challenge_method=plain, or no code_verifier at the token step refused S256: code exchanged PKCE is not enforced

Mutation receipt for the W1-4 verify column. In a sandbox copy (never the tracked tree, per assertion-design.md "done" #2), apply each arm and record red, then green against the unmutated code:

Arm Mutation Must turn red
(i) the intersection returns s unchanged N9
(ii) the A6 jku comparison is removed N18a
(iii) refresh skips the Graph re-check N20

A green arm is reported as one of: blind test, weak mutation, or equivalent mutant, with the reason.

A10. Implementation choice (recorded for ADR-010)

Selected candidate: node-oidc-provider embedded in loom-health-cp Fallback 1: Medplum authorizer extracted Fallback 2: minimal authorizer on jose
Licence MIT (ADR-010:24). Acceptable; AGPL is the only class excluded (OPERATOR-DECISIONS-2026-10-22.md:23) Apache-2.0 (ADR-010:25) jose is already a dependency (apps/loom-health-cp/package.json:25)
Why Same runtime and language as the service (package.json:9,22-27). An OAuth 2.x / OIDC server with PKCE, client-credentials, private_key_jwt and resource indicators. UNVERIFIED: none of its code or docs was read for this pass A complete SMART authorizer. UNVERIFIED: believed to be coupled to Medplum's own FHIR-resident client and membership model, which would mean carrying that model Implements only A3, A6 and A7; nothing else
Risk SMART-specific behaviour (launch handles, patient picker, scope intersection, the tenant/patient response params) is custom code on its extension points Extraction cost; a second data model Every OAuth edge case is ours; highest review burden

Pass bar. The candidate is confirmed only by the W1-4 implement receipt, never by this design. It must meet all of the following:

  1. The Inferno SMART App Launch kit (STU2: standalone and EHR launch, v2 scopes, PKCE, refresh) has zero failures against the Commercial sandbox stamp (W01-control-plane-identity-stamp.md:30). The value that breaks it is any fail row in the Inferno JSON.
  2. Matrix rows N1-N23 run, with arms (i)-(iii) red-then-green.
  3. Access-token and id_token signing keys are non-exportable Key Vault keys (HSM-backed), with signing done by the Key Vault sign operation. If the library can only sign with in-process private keys, this item fails unless the operator accepts the alternative (Q1).
  4. The Gov path: the authority and Graph hosts resolve per A5, verified with a unit test per cloud. The GCC-High receipt comes from a GitHub Actions run, never a workstation (PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:324-325).

Fallback trigger. If criterion 1 or 3 is not met within three implementation sessions, stop. Record the failing rows and move to Fallback 1. Fallback 2 is used only if Fallback 1 fails the same bar. The tokens are standard JWTs behind the same discovery document, so the swap leaves A7 unchanged (ADR-010:39-41).

A11. Open questions for the operator

  • Q1 Signing keys: require non-exportable HSM-backed Key Vault keys (recommended; this may force Fallback 2), or accept an exportable key injected through the CSI secret store (PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:168-173)?
  • Q2 Default for v1 scope syntax per tenant: on (recommended; AHDS parity, AHDS-MODEL-MAP.md:32) or off?
  • Q3 The PRP lists online_access (PRP/SECURITY-AND-COMPLIANCE.md:51), but the spec marks permission-online experimental. Recommendation: ship offline_access only in v1. This is a stated deviation that needs the operator's sign-off.
  • Q4 Client registration surface (SMART apps and Backend Services JWKS): the health-tenant Access tab via a control-plane admin route (recommended), or a separate item? No route is defined in the PRP today.
  • Q5 fhirUser linkage: which FHIR identifier system links a Practitioner to an Entra oid, and which wave provisions Practitioner resources?
  • Q6 Bindings, the jti cache and launch handles: three new Cosmos containers owned by src/auth/ (recommended; needs a control-plane.bicep row), or new TenantDoc fields (W1-3 code)?
  • Q7 Graph permission for the membership check on the AS identity: recommended least-privilege GroupMember.Read.All (application). This is UNVERIFIED as the minimum, and it is a tenant-admin consent gate.
  • Q8 Multiple Entra tenants per control plane (Commercial customers with their own Entra): in v1 or later? v1 as designed is one Entra tenant per control plane (config.ts:57).
  • Q9 Backend Services jwksUrl egress: allow-list each client's JWKS host in bicep (a reviewed change per client), or accept JWKS by value only in Gov?
  • Q10 User access-token lifetime: 300 s with refresh (recommended), or longer?
  • Q11 Purpose of use in W1: issue TREAT by default, or omit pou until W8?

A12. Implementation record (W1-4 server half)

Code: apps/loom-health-cp/src/auth/ (scopes.ts grammar and intersection, role-map.ts loader over the JSON, grant.ts, signer.ts, tokens.ts, backend-auth.ts, federation.ts, server.ts, cosmos.ts). Tests: test/auth-core.test.ts, test/auth-server.test.ts.

Decisions applied (operator, 2026-10-26). Signing keys are non-exportable Key Vault keys (KeyVaultSigner signs a SHA-384 digest through the vault sign call, so no private key enters the process); LocalSigner is the disclosed fallback authorizer and is never selected by default. offline_access only (Q3). Client registration is a control-plane route family (Q4): POST/GET /api/health/auth/clients, PATCH .../clients/{id}, PUT/GET .../tenants/{t}/bindings, POST .../launch, GET .../readiness. Three Cosmos containers (Q6): health-auth-config (bindings and clients), health-auth-replay and health-auth-grants (both per-item TTL). The Graph consent check is a gate with a Fix-it descriptor on readiness (Q7). One Entra tenant in W1 (Q8).

Not built, by design or dependency. The standalone patient picker (needs a FHIR engine, W2, and a UI): launch/patient without an EHR launch handle grants no patient context, so every patient/ scope is dropped. fhirUser is granted only when an injected resolver returns a URL (none is wired; Q5). Not wired into compose.ts / main.ts, so no route is live. Gate-registry registration of the consent gate is a console change.

UNMEASURED. The Inferno SMART App Launch kit (pass bar criterion 1) was not run. Key Vault sign, Entra token exchange and Graph checkMemberGroups were exercised only against fakes: their request shapes are unverified against the live services, and GroupMember.Read.All as the least-privilege permission stays UNVERIFIED (Q7). No cloud receipt exists for any boundary. N1-N8 (except N6/N8 grammar), N13-N17 and N21-N22 are PDP rows owned by W1-5.

Consequence of the intersection rule worth knowing. A wildcard request (user/*.cruds) against a client allow-list naming specific types (user/Patient.rs) grants nothing, because rule 2 matches a * request only to a * ceiling. Register * allow-lists, or have apps request typed scopes.