HIPAA Security Rule — CSA Loom extension¶
Comparative positioning note
This document is written from the perspective of Microsoft Azure, Cloud Scale Analytics, and CSA Loom. Any description of third-party or competing products, services, pricing, or capabilities is derived from publicly available documentation and sources believed accurate at the time of writing, and is provided for general comparison only. We do not claim expertise in, or authority over, any non-Microsoft product or service; the respective vendor's official documentation is the authoritative source for their offerings, which may change over time. Nothing here is intended to disparage any vendor — where a competing product has genuine advantages, we aim to note them honestly. Verify all third-party details against the vendor's current official documentation before making decisions.
How CSA Loom enables a customer's HIPAA Security Rule compliance. Extends parent docs/compliance/hipaa-security-rule.md.
HIPAA BAA scope¶
Microsoft Azure + Microsoft Power BI + Microsoft Purview are covered under the Microsoft Product Terms HIPAA Business Associate Agreement (BAA) across Azure Commercial + Azure Government boundaries.
CSA Loom is built entirely on these covered services, so the BAA applies to the underlying infrastructure. Customer must execute the BAA with Microsoft (typically via Enterprise Agreement or Microsoft Customer Agreement).
Customer responsibility¶
Loom enables; customer implements. The HIPAA Security Rule requires the customer to:
- Apply MIP sensitivity labels to PHI (Loom's catalog overlay surfaces these but doesn't auto-classify PHI)
- Implement workload-level access controls (RLS / CLS on PHI tables)
- Ensure data minimization in Loom Data Agents (don't expose entire patient records to general-purpose agents)
- Apply audit-log retention per HIPAA (6 years minimum)
- Execute breach notification procedures
- Maintain workforce HIPAA training
Loom contribution per Security Rule safeguard¶
Administrative safeguards¶
| Safeguard | Loom contribution |
|---|---|
| Security Management Process (§164.308(a)(1)) | Defender for Cloud + Sentinel + per-workload risk assessment via Loom Monitoring Hub |
| Workforce Security (§164.308(a)(3)) | Entra-based workforce access; PIM for elevated roles |
| Information Access Management (§164.308(a)(4)) | Per-workspace Entra groups + per-engine RBAC + sensitivity labels |
| Security Awareness (§164.308(a)(5)) | Workshop curricula (PRP-22) include HIPAA-aware modules |
| Contingency Plan (§164.308(a)(7)) | DR pattern + RPO/RTO per component |
| Evaluation (§164.308(a)(8)) | Quarterly DR drill + Sentinel review |
Physical safeguards¶
Inherited from Azure datacenter controls (Microsoft-managed).
Technical safeguards¶
| Safeguard | Loom contribution |
|---|---|
| Access Control (§164.312(a)) | Entra MFA + PIM + OBO throughout Copilot |
| Audit Controls (§164.312(b)) | Activity Log + App Insights + LAW + Sentinel; 6-year retention configurable |
| Integrity (§164.312©) | TLS 1.2+ in transit; encryption at rest; signed container images |
| Person/Entity Authentication (§164.312(d)) | Entra ID with conditional access |
| Transmission Security (§164.312(e)) | TLS 1.2+; Private Endpoints; egress allow-list |
PHI handling patterns in Loom¶
Storing PHI¶
- Place PHI tables under a dedicated DLZ ("clinical-domain")
- Mark PHI columns with MIP sensitivity label (e.g.,
Restricted-PHI) - Apply RLS to enforce per-user access by role
- Apply CLS to hide sensitive columns (SSN, MRN) from non-clinical users
Mirroring PHI sources¶
- For SQL Server / Postgres / Oracle PHI sources, use Loom Mirroring Engine
- Mirroring runs under workspace UAMI; source must grant CDC read
- CDC stream lands in Bronze (sensitivity-labeled inherited from source)
- Apply transformations to redact non-essential PHI before Silver / Gold
PHI in Loom Data Agents¶
- Restrict general-purpose Data Agents from PHI tables (set
sensitivityPolicy: "Block agent on tables tagged PHI") - Create separate clinical-domain agents with explicit consent
- audit
- Agent identity-passthrough (OBO) ensures only authorized clinicians see PHI in agent responses
- Sentinel rule monitors for agent attempts to access PHI by non-authorized users
PHI in Loom Copilot¶
- Loom Copilot's PII redaction (existing
redaction.py) covers PHI patterns (SSN, dates of birth, addresses) - Per-turn telemetry logged; Sentinel detects abuse patterns
- In Gov, self-hosted Presidio side-car runs PHI detection BEFORE AOAI call
Per-boundary HIPAA posture¶
| Boundary | HIPAA BAA | Loom-relevant notes |
|---|---|---|
| Commercial | ✅ | Full feature set; ideal for non-federal healthcare |
| GCC | ✅ | M365 GCC tenant for healthcare-specific federal data |
| GCC-High | ✅ | Strict federal healthcare (e.g., VHA classified workloads) |
| IL5 | ✅ | Limited use cases (federal healthcare classification rare) |
Validation¶
Customer should: 1. Confirm BAA executed with Microsoft 2. Audit Loom Console "Catalog" to verify all PHI tables sensitivity- labeled 3. Audit Loom Data Agents config to verify PHI restrictions 4. Run Sentinel queries quarterly to verify access patterns 5. Test breach notification workflow
Related¶
- Parent: HIPAA Security Rule
- Defender workaround: Defender AI workaround
- Feature × boundary matrix
- Use case: Healthcare Clinical example port — Healthcare